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INTRODUCTION 
“When selection of cy pres beneficiaries is not tethered to the nature of the lawsuit 
and the interests of the silent class members, the selection process may answer to the 
whims and self interests of the parties, their counsel, or the court.”  
– Judge N. Randy Smith1 
Forty-five years ago, the ancient doctrine of “cy pres” was lifted from the 
pages of trust law and applied, for the first time, to the class action context. 
Cy pres stood for the proposition that, when the explicit purpose of a 
charitable trust became impossible, the court should look to the testator’s2 
intent and apply the trust to its next best use. In the class action context, cy 
pres was an equitable “patch” necessitated by the expanding scope of the 
class action mechanism at the state and federal levels. Generally, the 
concept has come to mean that when distributing damages to an individual 
class member is impossible or impractical, the court should use those 
damages for the benefit of the class at large. 
However, the current class action litigation system does not consistently 
follow this standard. Cy pres awards lack the procedural and adversarial 
protections needed to ensure their fairness and accuracy. Courts, even when 
trying to apply cy pres for the benefit of the member class, are poorly suited 
to decide how best to benefit the class. And, unfortunately, cy pres awards 
are all too often diverted to general charity or directed to charitable projects 
of interest to the judge or lawyers involved in the case. These outcomes 
deprive class members of the benefits of their suit and cast a pallor of 
impropriety on the class action mechanism.  
Fortunately, a remedy exists and can be deployed discretionarily without 
legislation or amendment to the Federal Rules. Because cy pres aims to 
approximate the benefit that individual damages would provide to class 
members, courts should ask the class how best to utilize cy pres awards. 
Through a crowdsourced, democratic voting process, courts could seek the 
 
1 Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011).  
2 “One who makes or has made a testament or will; one who dies leaving a will.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (6th ed. 1990). 
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input of identified class members at low marginal cost. This mechanism 
would add a democratic element to the cy pres process and largely obviate 
potential or perceived ethical violations. Moreover, it would improve 
judicial accuracy in awarding cy pres funds, enabling more of their compen-
satory value to flow to the injured class. This proposal modernizes class 
action cy pres while honoring its ancient origins by returning to cy pres’s 
core goal: adhering as closely as possible to the intended outcome.  
I. INCORPORATING CY PRES INTO THE CLASS ACTION 
A. Cy Pres in Trust Law 
Although legal historians dispute the origins of the term,3 the principle 
of cy pres can be traced back at least as far as the sixth-century Roman 
Empire.4 The close relation between law and religion during the Middle 
Ages, especially at the time of death, likely gave rise to cy pres in English 
law.5 In medieval England, the deceased’s estate was commonly divided, 
with one third (“the dead’s part”) applied by the administrators “for the 
good of his soul in such pious works as they shall think best according to 
God and good conscience.”6 The courts recognized that the public benefit of 
charitable acts, and the value to the testator’s soul, would be lost if such 
charitable donations reverted to the heirs when the gift intended could not 
be completed.7 To avoid this outcome, the courts would rededicate the gift 
 
3 It has been theorized that the phrase “cy pres” has its origins in the Norman French “cy pres 
comme possible” (“as near as possible”), EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (1950), or the Anglo French “si-près” (“so near” or “as near”), Cypres, OXFORD 
ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/46668 (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/A5TX-R2YQ. Alternatively, the term may well have originated independently 
in Law-French. See L. A. SHERIDAN & V. T. H. DELANY, THE CY-PRÈS DOCTRINE 5 (1959) 
(noting the difficulty of determining the meaning of the phrase in Anglo-Norman Law-French). 
4 In a case that appears in the Digest of Justinian, the Roman courts were confronted with a 
legacy left to a city for the purpose of preserving the donor’s memory through yearly games, which 
had since been rendered illegal. The jurist Modestinus, recognizing that allowing the funds to 
revert to the heirs would be unjust, instead proposed that “an investigation be made to ascertain 
how the trust may be employed so that the memory of the deceased may be preserved in some 
other and lawful manner.” SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 3, at 7-8 (citing DIG. 33.2.16 
(Modestinus, Responsorum 9)). 
5 See Hamish Gray, The History and Development in England of the Cy-Près Principle in Charities, 
33 B.U. L. REV. 30, 32-33 (1953) (noting the close association between the last will and the last 
confession, the Ordinary’s role in administering the estates of the deceased, and the church’s role 
as the dominant recipient of charity).  
6 Id. at 33 (quoting 4 RICHARD DE KELLAWE, REGISTRUM PALATINUM DUNELMENSE 
369 (Thomas Duffus Hardy ed., London, Longman & Co. 1878)).  
7 Id. at 34-35. It has been hypothesized that the rise of cy pres was a result of “piety and 
greed,” because the chancellor simultaneously served as a church official and thus had the “twin 
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to an alternative use in line with the donor’s intentions. These early princi-
ples of cy pres were adopted and codified in the Statute of Charitable Uses,8 
a broad statute with “such medicinal qualities in it, as to heal every imper-
fection in a charitable disposition, provided the party had a legal capacity to 
give at all.”9  
In England, cy pres took on two distinct forms: judicial cy pres and 
prerogative cy pres. While judicial cy pres arose from the king’s equitable 
powers, prerogative cy pres originated in the king’s protective powers over 
his subjects as “parens patriae” (or “parent of the nation”), making him the 
constitutional trustee of all gifts devoted to the public or to “charity” 
generally.10 With time, these prerogative powers transferred to the chancellor 
as proxy for the king, while the judicial cy pres powers simultaneously 
resided in the chancellor in his judicial capacity.11 The chancellor’s judicial 
cy pres powers eventually became part of the Chancery Court’s inherent 
jurisdiction.12 The remainder, in the form of prerogative cy pres, were 
retained by the crown.13  
Judicial cy pres evolved as an “intent-enforcing doctrine”; the chancellor 
or the courts could act only when the donor manifested a specific charitable 
intention that could be effectuated.14 The crown retained its prerogative cy 
pres powers in situations when the testator’s intent was too broad to guide 
the courts, such as gifts to “charity” generally or when the testator’s intent 
was illegal.15 Although multiple theories abound as to why these specific 
powers were retained, the best explanation is that illegal donations revert to 
 
incentives of saving the person’s soul and keeping the funds within the church.” Martin H. Redish 
et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical 
Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 626 (2010).  
8 The Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (Eng.), reprinted in GARETH JONES, 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532–1827, at 224-28 (1969).  
9 Attorney Gen. v. Downing, (1767) 97 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B.) 5; Wilm. 1, 11. 
10 A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 304 (1939). This power thus rested at the heart 
of the powers that became modern equity jurisprudence.  
11 See id. (describing the historical evolution of cy pres powers in English jurisprudence).  
12 See SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 3, at 10 (stating that “their rules in this matter were 
taken over by the Court of Chancery”). 
13 See A Revaluation of Cy Pres, supra note 10, at 304 (“[C]y pres could still be exercised only 
by the crown . . . where a gift was void for being devoted to a purpose illegal or contrary to public 
policy, or where a gift was made to charity generally.”).  
14 Id. at 305.  
15 Id. at 304-05; see also FISCH, supra note 3, at 57 (“The Crown . . . retained the power to 
designate a charitable purpose . . . where the object of the gift was illegal or void as contrary to 
public policy, and where a gift was made to charity generally without the interposition of a 
trustee.”).  
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a broad charitable intent, which is the core of prerogative cy pres.16 When 
such a general charitable intent existed, the king (as parens patriae) was 
better situated than a court to decide how the gift could best serve the 
public good. Prerogative cy pres thus operated at the crown’s discretion, 
“without regard for the donor’s intended purpose.”17  
The United States was slow to adopt cy pres principles. The colonists 
feared that prerogative cy pres would trump individual rights18 and confused 
prerogative and judicial cy pres because the English case law did not 
distinguish between the two.19 They therefore feared that the principle’s 
adoption would vest too much power in the judiciary, allowing judicial 
efficiency to override the testator’s intent.20 Early American decisions also 
confused the legal status of cy pres, mistakenly concluding that it was not 
part of the common law prior to its codification.21 Despite this initial 
reluctance, many states later affirmed the use of cy pres by the courts, and 
 
16 A Revaluation of Cy Pres, supra note 10, at 304 (“[W]hen a gift . . . was declared void, there 
remained only the broad charitable intent which characterizes a general gift to charity.”). It has 
also been posited that the retention of crown jurisdiction over illegal gifts resulted from the 
overwhelmingly political nature of such gifts, the majority of which were illegal because they 
involved donations to religious orders other than the Church of England. Id. 
17 Id. at 305. An excellent illustration of the prerogative power can be found in Da Costa v. De 
Pas, (1754) 27 Eng. Rep. (Ch.) 150; Amb. 228, 228, wherein the decedent left assets for the 
establishment of a yeshiva in England. At that time, no gift could be given to any religious 
institution other than the Church of England, rendering the gift impossible by illegality. Id.; Amb. 
228. The chancellor, as the king’s proxy, saved the charitable intent of the gift—but not the donor’s 
sectarian intent—by donating the gift to a foundling hospital for the purpose of instructing boys 
in the Christian religion. Id. at 152; Amb. 228.  
18 See FISCH, supra note 3, at 60-61 (“Such far fetched and arbitrary applications of the 
prerogative cy pres prejudiced some of the American courts against the application of cy pres in 
any form . . . .”). Even contemporary English judges were wary of the doctrine. Chief Justice Lord 
Kenyon, in the 1801 case of Brudenell v. Elwes, cautioned that “[t]he doctrine of cy pres goes to the 
utmost verge of the law, even in the construction of wills; and we must take care that it does not 
run wild.” (1801) 102 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B.) 174; 1 East, 442, 451.  
19 See FISCH, supra note 3, at 56-57 (explaining that confusion resulted from the chancellor’s 
failure to distinguish between prerogative and judicial cy pres).  
20 See id. at 60 (discussing America’s unease in adopting cy pres based on England’s “unre-
stricted application of the prerogative power sometimes result[ing] in donating . . . property to 
purposes which were not in accord with the desires of the donor”).  
21 See id. at 9-12 (noting the misconception among American courts that jurisdiction over 
charitable trusts derived solely from an English statute that the colonial legislatures had repealed); 
see also Trs. of the Phila. Baptist Ass’n v. Hart’s Ex’rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1, 7 (1819) (“[T]he Court 
of Chancery in England exercises [cy pres] solely in virtue of the statute of the 43d Eliz. All 
ancient precedents of the exercise of such powers, to effect such charitable uses, are expressly 
stated to be founded on that statute.”). 
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judicial cy pres has since been codified in an overwhelming majority of 
states.22 
B. Importing Cy Pres into Class Actions 
Throughout its extensive history and into the twentieth century, the 
concept of cy pres was limited to the law of trust and estates. There was no 
need to invoke cy pres in the remedies context because the existing legal 
structure did not allow for many situations in which damages could arise 
without a clear recipient. The framework, however, shifted dramatically in 
the 1960s. At the federal level, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was 
revised to expand the class action mechanism.23 The expanded rule allowed 
the inclusion of absent class members in mandatory class actions.24 The 
amendments thus enabled substantial funds to remain unclaimed, either 
because the class members were too difficult to identify, the administrative 
costs of reaching the individual class members were prohibitively burdensome, 
or the class members failed to receive or respond to notifications of their 
inclusion in the class award.25 At the state level, courts have also grappled 
with whether to allow and how to conduct class actions on behalf of uniden-
tifiable injured parties.26 
One of the many academic works inspired by this shift was a comment 
by University of Chicago law student Stewart R. Shepherd, which proposed 
using the cy pres doctrine to guide the distribution of unclaimed class 
action damages.27 Shepherd argued that “[w]hen distribution problems 
arise . . . , courts may seek to apply their own version of cy pres by effectuating 
as closely as possible the intent of the legislature in providing the legal 
 
22 See Redish, supra note 7, at 628 & n.59 (“Currently forty-six states and the District of 
Columbia have codified judicial cy pres.”).  
23 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to the 1966 amendments (summarizing 
the intended solutions to the problems with the earlier versions of the class action rules). 
24 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).  
25 It was already possible for class actions to result in unexpected remainders after distribu-
tions had been completed as a result of unresponsive class members or interest accrued during 
litigation, but the changes to Rule 23 greatly increased the likelihood of unclaimed funds 
remaining at the end of a class action. For further discussion of the reasons that class action 
litigation may result in unclaimed funds, see Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action 
Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 7-10), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2413951. 
26 See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 736, 747 (Cal. 1967) (en banc) (allowing a 
class action to proceed on behalf of all of the patrons who used a Los Angeles taxicab company 
within a four year time period).  
27 See Stewart R. Shepherd, Comment, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 
39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448, 452 (1972) (“This procedure of finding a next-best recipient for 
[unclaimed class action] funds is analogous to the doctrine of cy pres.”). 
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remedies on which the main cause of action was based.”28 This solution 
responded to the problems posed by class members’ failure to act, preserving 
the equity of the class action mechanism and the deterrent value of the 
damages.29 
Shepherd proposed three forms of cy pres distribution: (1) redistribu-
tion of uncollected damages to collecting class members; (2) distribution to 
the state, unconditionally or with restrictions, to benefit the class; and (3) 
distribution through the free market.30 Shepherd retained the cy pres 
doctrine’s core: each proposed alternative sought to find a “next best” means 
of compensating class members who could not be compensated directly.31 It 
was, furthermore, heavily based on existing case law, rendering it as much 
an objective study as a theoretical exercise.32 Nonetheless, Shepherd also 
allowed that “[a]s it becomes more difficult, or even impossible, to ascertain 
which alternate recipients the legislature would prefer, it may be appropriate 
to devote the funds to a broader public service in order to maximize the 
benefit to society.”33 Later scholarship built on Shepherd’s work and extended 
his logic to justify the use of charitable trusts, sometimes in lieu of direct 
distributions.34 Although critics contend that this line of scholarship led cy 
pres astray,35 cy pres’s rapid growth and expansion more likely resulted from 
 
28 Id.  
29 See id. at 448 (noting some of the problems that result when class members fail to collect 
their share of damages).  
30 Id. at 453-63.  
31 Redish, supra note 7, at 633.  
32 All of the mechanisms Shepherd described as cy pres were in fact already in use previously. 
See Jennifer Johnston, Comment, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything is Possible: How Cy Pres 
Creates Improper Incentives in Class Action Settlements, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 277, 282 (2013) 
(describing how, “[p]rior to the use of charitable cy pres, the residual funds often reverted back to 
the defendant or escheat to the state” as fluid recoveries); see also, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 27, at 
454 (finding that the state could claim the uncollected damages in a class action (citing Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972))); id. at 457 (“The concept of utilizing the state 
as a mechanism for damage distribution to the class as a whole . . . is not entirely new to the 
courts.” (citing Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 171 P.2d 875 (Cal. 1946))); id. at 458-60 
(discussing a well known case suggesting a market distribution cy pres remedy (citing Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 
U.S. 156 (1974))).  
33 Shepherd, supra note 27, at 453. 
34 See, e.g., Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class 
Actions, 96 YALE L.J. 1591, 1600 (1987) (favoring the use of equitable trusts as a cy pres mechanism 
for damages in small claim consumer class actions); Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The Consumer Trust 
Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 
765 (1987) (arguing for the addition of the “consumer trust fund” to other established forms of cy 
pres and calling it “the best method of achieving the ultimate goals of the cy pres doctrine”). 
35 Martin Redish argues that after these notes, cy pres “was no longer focused wholly on 
finding an alternative means of indirectly compensating victims who could not feasibly be 
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the realities of judicial administration and the difficulty of crafting accurate, 
effective cy pres remedies.36  
C. Judicial Importation of Cy Pres 
The courts quickly adopted cy pres in class actions. The earliest nominal 
use came in 1974 in a shareholder suit against the Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton 
Corporation (BLH).37 The court, “applying a variant of the cy pres doctrine 
at common law,” and finding no contrary precedent, approved a class 
settlement that paid the settlement fund to the Trustees of the BLH 
Retirement Plan, concluding that the modest size of the settlement fund 
and the large number of outstanding shares rendered direct compensation of 
the impacted shareholders unviable.38 Since then, cy pres has become 
commonplace in class actions. Although individual applications of the 
doctrine may be challenged on their facts, the doctrine’s use has become 
routine for state and federal courts.39  
In the class action context, the cy pres nearness requirement has been 
interpreted in a number of ways. As Stewart Shepherd originally conceived 
class action cy pres, the nearness requirement was meant to effectuate the 
“intent of the legislature in providing the legal remedies on which the main 
cause of action was based.”40 This intent, Shepherd recognized, usually 
would be “to compensate only the injured parties.”41 Unsurprisingly, courts 
seeking to satisfy the nearness requirement often use approximations based 
on the compensatory value of damages or the notion of optimizing the 
 
compensated directly, but rather simply on seeking a beneficial use of the compensatory funds 
exacted from the defendant.” Redish, supra note 7, at 634.  
36 See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Leaving the Bench, 1970-2009: The Choices Federal Judges 
Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012) (“In 
the four decades since 1970, the number of civil and criminal dispositions by the federal district 
courts has increased enormously.”).  
37 Redish, supra note 7, at 635. 
38 Miller v. Steinbach, No. 66 Civ. 356, 1974 WL 350, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1974).  
39 Anthony J. Anscombe, Cy Pres: ‘As Close As Possible’ Is Not Good Enough, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 
2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/478314/cy-pres-as-close-as-possible-is-not-good-
enough, archived at http://perma.cc/JB4W-SX99 (“[C]y pres is routinely invoked by courts and 
counsel to redirect money to charities when class members do not claim it.”).  
40 Shepherd, supra note 27, at 452.  
41 Id. But see AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
§ 3.07(c) (2009) (recognizing that the interests of a cy pres recipient should “reasonably 
approximate those being pursued by the class”). The ALI approach implies that the proper focus 
for the nearness inquiry should be on the nature of the harm and not the compensatory value of 
damages. 
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benefit to the entire class.42 In the current system, pursuing nearness is not 
an absolute. When benefit to the class becomes unattainable, Shepherd 
argued, it could “be appropriate to devote [cy pres] funds to a broader 
public service in order to maximize the benefit to society.”43 Numerous 
courts have adopted this reasoning, applying the nearness requirement less 
rigidly when the nature of the harm or the passage of time complicates its 
application.44  
Courts have also standardized the nearness requirement in a four part 
test considering (1) the objectives of the underlying statute, (2) the nature 
of the underlying suit, (3) the interests of the class members, and (4) the 
geographic scope of the case.45 Yet, this analysis is sufficiently vague to 
facilitate multiple interpretations of the nearness requirement.46 Thus, 
despite the nearness requirement and contrary guidance,47 some courts have 
even awarded cy pres when distribution of individual damages was not 
entirely foreclosed.48 Judge Jan E. DuBois, describing current cy pres 
practice, observed that:  
In applying the cy pres doctrine to distribute remaining class funds, many 
courts choose charitable organizations based on consideration of whether 
 
42 See, e.g., Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To ensure that the 
settlement retains some connection to the plaintiff class and the underlying claims, however, a cy 
pres award must qualify as ‘the next best distribution’ to giving the funds directly to class 
members.” (citation omitted)). 
43 Shepherd, supra note 27, at 453. 
44 See, e.g., Jones v. Nat’l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Distribution of 
th[e] fund residue outside the class thus is entirely proper, so long as the choice of recipient is 
appropriate under the circumstances.”); Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. 
Supp. 477, 479 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“[W]hile use of funds for purposes closely related to their origin is 
still the best cy pres application, the doctrine of cy pres and courts’ broad equitable powers now 
permit use of funds for other public interest purposes by educational, charitable, and other public 
service organizations . . . .”); 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10.24 (4th ed. 2002) (“[W]here 
the parties have not agreed as part of a settlement for the disposition of . . . unclaimed balance, the 
court . . . may order the residual monies to be distributed to a use completely unrelated to the 
injured class members, such as to an educational institution, to a recognized charity or public 
service organization, or to the . . . government.” (footnotes omitted)). 
45 See Schwartz v. Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 362 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (E.D. Pa. 
2005) (citing In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 2002)).  
46 See, e.g., Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., Nos. 01-2118, 02-1018, 2007 WL 
2007447, at *1-2, *4 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (applying the four part standard and approving a cy pres 
award in a chemical price-fixing case to the George Washington University School of Law in order 
to develop a Center for Competition Law, on the grounds that the Center would “benefit the 
plaintiff class and similarly situated parties by . . . protect[ing] them from future antitrust 
violations and violations of other competition laws” (citation omitted)).  
47 See AM. LAW INST., supra note 41, § 3.07(c) (allowing cy pres only when individual dis-
tributions are not viable).  
48 See, e.g., infra note 52. 
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the distribution furthers the objectives underlying the original lawsuit. 
Other courts, however, have expanded the cy pres doctrine to permit distri-
butions to charitable organizations whether or not such organizations have 
any direct or indirect relationship to the specific law or subject matter of the 
litigation.49  
Although some commentators allege that the courts “seem to feel no need to 
find a form of relief that will ultimately have the effect of indirectly com-
pensating as-yet uncompensated class members,”50 indirect compensation of 
uncompensated class members remains a key part of many courts’ cy pres 
standards.51 Some courts have even recognized potential due process 
violations when the need to benefit the class as a whole is not sufficiently 
weighed.52 Nonetheless, deviation from the nearness requirement occurs 
with sufficient frequency that one federal judge has warned that “in practice, 
cy pres remedies often stray far from the ‘next best use’ for the undistributed 
funds and turn courts into a grant giving institution doling out funds.”53 
Courts employ various methods to determine where to direct cy pres 
distributions. Often, parties settling class actions identify proposed cy pres 
beneficiaries in the settlement agreement, subject to judicial approval.54 
When a recipient is not specified, courts often solicit proposed cy pres 
 
49 In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., Nos. 98-5055, 99-1341, 2008 WL 4542669, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 3, 2008) (citations omitted).  
50 Redish, supra note 7, at 634. 
51 See, e.g., Order on Cy Pres Provision of Settlement Agreement at 4, In re Compact Disc 
Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. 00-1361 (D. Me. June 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Hornby/MDL/MDL1361_2005_06_10_ORDER28.pdf 
(considering, inter alia, “the degree to which the cy pres proposal will benefit class members; the 
degree to which it will promote the purposes of the underlying cause of action that has been 
settled; [and] the minimization of administrative costs”).  
52 See, e.g., Coppolino v. Total Call Int’l, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 2d 594, 605 n.6 (D.N.J. 2008) 
(speculating that a cy pres award to two churches and Pepperdine University raised due process 
concerns because “it is not clear how the donations . . . benefitted class members” and the 
defendant “has produced no findings of the Tennessee court that it would not be feasible to 
distribute the money to the class or otherwise use the money for a purpose that would benefit the 
class”). 
53 SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
54 See, e.g., Miller v. Steinbach, No. 66 Civ. 356, 1974 WL 350, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1974) 
(directing the funds from a securities class action by BLH shareholders to the Trustee of the BLH 
Retirement Plan); cf. In re Janney Montgomery Scott LCC Fin. Consultant Litig., No. 06-3202, 
2009 WL 2137224, at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2009) (allowing the court to choose the cy pres recipient 
in a class action settlement from three potential beneficiaries identified by counsel); Order on Cy 
Pres Provision of Settlement Agreement, supra note 51, at 1-2 (allowing the cy pres distribution of 
any remaining funds at the court’s discretion). 
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recipients from counsel.55 A few courts, seeking to eliminate potential biases 
and to ensure the best possible slate of recipients, publically advertise cy 
pres distributions and allow potential recipients to submit their own 
proposals.56 Other courts, when faced with remainders, deposit the funds in 
the court registry for later distribution.57 Some courts have even outsourced 
much of the legwork involved in cy pres by appointing special masters or cy 
pres committees to advise the court on the most appropriate recipient.58 In 
all these mechanisms, however, the judge retains the ultimate power and 
obligation to decide on the proposed distributions. And although most 
courts require that potential cy pres beneficiaries have no relationship to 
counsel or the court,59 others lack or do not enforce such provisions, facili-
tating ethically dubious cy pres awards.60  
 
55 See, e.g., In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 01 Civ. 1855, 2010 WL 3431152, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2010) (inviting plaintiffs’ counsel to submit at least six proposed cy pres 
recipients in line with the ALI Draft Principles of Aggregate Litigation); Order on Cy Pres 
Provision of Settlement Agreement, supra note 51, at 2 (considering four proposed cy pres 
recipients, three nominated by counsel and one nominated by an objector). 
56 See, e.g., Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 478 (N.D. Ill. 
1993) (describing how the court, after publishing notice inviting applications for cy pres awards, 
held hearings with representatives of fifteen applicant organizations).  
57 In one noteworthy case, a federal judge held the remainder from a baby-formula price-
fixing class action for five years before finally donating the majority of the remainder to the Red 
Cross’s Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. In re Infant Formula Multidistrict Litig., No. 91-878, 2005 
WL 2211312, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2005). 
58 For examples of the use of a special master, see Bellows v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No. 07-1413, 
2009 WL 35466, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009), where the special master’s report and recommenda-
tion proposed fifteen cy pres recipients, and Referral to Special Master for Development of Plan 
to Allocate and Distribute Settlement Proceeds at 2-3, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., No. 96-
4849 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999), in which the settlement agreement required a special master to 
develop a court-approved plan of allocation and distribution. For an example of the use of a cy 
pres committee, see Order, Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 05-4206 (E.D. La. Sept. 18, 2009), 
where the court invited counsel to recommend committee members for a cy pres committee that 
was formed to make recommendations to the court on geographically related uses of remaining 
class funds. See also CAL. CONSUMER PROT. FOUND., FORUM ON THE CY PRES DOCTRINE 6 
(2010) (recounting strong support for the use of professional administration of cy pres awards to 
provide a “fair, efficient process” while “relieving [the] burden on the court and attorneys”); 
BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING 
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 33 (2009) (encouraging the use 
of special masters in complex class actions). 
59 See infra note 99 (presenting an example of a court rejecting a proposed cy pres award 
because counsel were interested in the beneficiaries).  
60 See generally infra Section II.C. According to congressional testimony, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
and courts have directed cy pres awards to their alma maters and charities run by family members. 
Examination of Litigation Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution & Civil Justice of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 30-31 (2013) [hereinafter Litigation Abuses] (statement of 
Theodore H. Frank, Adjunct Fellow, Manhattan Institute for Legal Policy, President, Center for 
Class Action Fairness).  
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D. Academic Responses 
Cy pres has largely been accepted as a necessary evil in the class action 
context. Cy pres is one of few mechanisms with the potential to benefit 
unidentified class members. Without cy pres or a similar doctrine, due 
process considerations might severely reduce the number of viable class 
actions.61 Abandonment of class action cy pres would also leave the substan-
tial question of what to do with leftover funds. The reversion of the 
remainder to the defendant would partially undermine the deterrent effect 
of the damages.62 Escheat to the state offers a better resolution because it 
preserves the deterrent purposes of the underlying law; however, general 
escheat all but sacrifices the compensatory purpose of the underlying statute 
by diluting the benefit among the general population.63 Reversion of the 
remainder to identified class members offers a better solution, although it 
leaves unidentified class members without any benefit and overcompensates 
participating class members with an undeserved windfall.64 In light of these 
alternatives, courts routinely conclude that cy pres, even to general charity, 
is the only viable outcome.65  
Despite cy pres’s clear benefits, it also confronts serious and substantial 
criticism. Cy pres awards introduce nonparty actors into litigation, 
transforming “an adversar[ial] bilateral dispute . . . into a less-than-fully-
adversarial trilateral process, wholly unknown to the adjudicatory structure 
 
61 Shepherd, supra note 27, at 448-49. Alternatively, classes could be redefined to include only 
responsive class members, although this would undermine the value of the global peace that a class 
action can promise for defendants. Id. at 449-50. 
62 See AM. LAW INST., supra note 41, § 3.07 cmt. b (suggesting that returning remaining 
funds to the defendant “would undermine the deterrence function of class actions and the 
underlying substantive-law basis of the recovery by rewarding the alleged wrongdoer”). 
63 See id. (favoring cy pres awards to recipients whose interests benefit the class over general 
escheat, which benefits “all citizens equally, even those who were not harmed by the defendant’s 
alleged conduct”); cf. In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 363 (3d Cir. 2010) (Weis, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (contending that “repayment to the government to defray some of the 
costs of the court system would be in the nature of a user fee”). But see Wasserman, supra note 25 
(manuscript at 16) (questioning the equity of “imposing [the escheat] ‘fee’ on settling class 
members when no other litigants have to pay to have their claims adjudicated in court”).  
64 This phenomenon could conceivably incentivize named plaintiffs to bring class actions in 
which the majority of the class would be unidentifiable in the hopes that the unidentified 
members’ shares would be redirected to the identifiable class members. Shepherd, supra note 27, at 
453 (“[T]he deficiencies of this method of distribution make it a generally unacceptable alterna-
tive.”). But see AM. LAW INST., supra note 41, § 3.07 cmt. b (“[F]ew settlements award 100 
percent of a class member’s losses, and thus it is unlikely in most cases that further distributions to 
class members would result in more than 100 percent recovery for those class members.”).  
65 Cf. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari) 
(arguing the need for “an opportunity to address more fundamental concerns surrounding the use 
of [cy pres] in class action litigation, including when, if ever, such relief should be considered”).  
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contemplated by Article III.”66 Indeed, the prospect of a cy pres award can 
generate interested parties without the knowledge of counsel or the court.67 
Cy pres is also alleged to function as an “illegitimate transformation,” 
converting compensatory substantive law into the equivalent of a punitive 
civil fine, at least when cy pres is applied without regard to the benefit of 
the class.68 And cy pres raises concerns about the due process rights of 
unrepresented class members. These concerns arise because class counsel 
receive the same compensation whether they distribute individual damages 
or secure a cy pres award and regardless of the cy pres distribution’s actual 
benefit to the class.69  
Despite these flaws, no viable alternative to cy pres exists. Although 
some scholars have offered recommendations to improve the integrity of the 
cy pres process, existing proposals would impose significant transaction 
costs and depend on action by the Federal Rules Committee or Congress, 
rendering their enactment difficult.70 Conversely, without cy pres, unidenti-
fied class members would receive neither damages nor benefits from the 
litigation that supposedly represents them. That outcome would only 
exacerbate due process concerns and undermine the class action litigation 
system. But more robust procedural standards to govern the cy pres process 
can mitigate, though perhaps not eliminate, many of these concerns.  
 
66 Redish, supra note 7, at 641.  
67 Once a charitable entity becomes aware that it is being considered as a potential cy pres 
recipient, it has an incentive to attempt to intervene and influence the outcome in its favor.  
68 Id. at 644-48. Notably, Judge Richard Posner espoused this view in Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mort-
gage Corp., explaining that 
[i]n the class action context the reason for appealing to cy pres is to prevent the 
defendant from walking away from the litigation scot-free because of the infeasibility 
of distributing the proceeds of the settlement . . . to the class members. There is no 
indirect benefit to the class from the defendant’s giving the money to someone else. In 
such a case the “cy pres” remedy . . . is purely punitive. 
356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004). 
69 Redish, supra note 7, at 650 (discussing the possibility of conflicts of interest for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in cy pres award cases).  
70 Rhonda Wasserman, for instance, has offered a reform agenda based around four recom-
mendations: (1) reducing attorneys’ fees presumptively in cases where cy pres distributions are 
made, (2) requiring disclosures from class counsel supporting the need for and propriety of cy pres 
distributions, (3) using devil’s advocates to ensure closer scrutiny of cy pres proposals, and (4) 
requiring courts to make written findings in their review of class action settlements including cy 
pres awards. Wasserman, supra note 25 (manuscript at 1-2). Professor Wasserman’s proposal, unlike 
this Comment, focuses on the interaction between courts and counsel and not on the interaction 
between courts and class members. Thus, while her proposal could improve the integrity of the 
process, it would not resolve the informational problems addressed herein.  
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II. WHY CY PRES GETS IT WRONG 
Courts and critics agree that something is wrong with class action cy 
pres as it is practiced today. Increasingly, courts have given substantial cy 
pres awards to charitable causes unconnected to the underlying suit that 
provide negligible benefits to the class. Such awards do not achieve the 
underlying goals of class action cy pres and they raise substantial questions 
of fairness. When courts award cy pres without considering legislative 
intent or benefit to the class, their actions come to resemble prerogative cy 
pres, a variant of cy pres with no basis in American law.  
A. Inequitable Outcomes 
Modern cy pres often yields inequitable outcomes. Courts routinely 
award cy pres to organizations that have no rational ties to the underlying 
class action, with no expectation that the funds will benefit absent class 
members. Consider some common cy pres award recipients: bar founda-
tions,71 law schools,72 law professors,73 the National Association of Public 
Interest Law,74 and other public interest law organizations.75 Awards to 
 
71 See, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., Nos. 98-5055, 99-1341, 2008 WL 4542669, at *5 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2008) (awarding the $126,832.82 remainder in an antitrust case against the 
makers of cardboard box components to the Philadelphia Bar Foundation); Nienaber v. Citibank 
(S.D.) N.A., No. 04-4054, 2007 WL 752297, at *3 (D.S.D. Mar. 7, 2007) (distributing cy pres funds 
to the South Dakota Bar Foundation, the Minnesota Chapter of the Federal Bar Foundation, the 
Philadelphia Bar Foundation, the National Consumer Law Center, and the South Dakota 
Community Foundation); In re Scouring Pads Antitrust Litig., No. 93 Civ. 6594, 1995 WL 290242, 
at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 1995) (awarding a $50,000 cy pres distribution in an antitrust litigation to 
the nonprofit Illinois Lawyer’s Assistance Program and over $4000 to support a Chicago Bar 
Foundation symposium on Legal Services for the Poor).  
72 See, e.g., Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 481-83 (N.D. Ill. 
1993) (awarding $125,000 to the University of Illinois College of Law’s Minority Access Program 
and $750,000 to the Loyola University of Chicago School of Law to establish an Institute for 
Consumer Antitrust Studies); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. 310, 53 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 711 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1987) (awarding $242,195.89 to both the 
University of Texas Law School Foundation and the University of Houston Law Foundation, 
$103,062.07 to the Texas Tech University Law School Foundation, and $61,837.25 to the Texas 
Southern University Foundation, Stanford Law School, and the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School for use “to teach advocacy skills, principles, and ethics” on the grounds that the awards 
“will immeasurably assist in the preparation of lawyers with expertise in complex consumer-
oriented litigation”). 
73 See, e.g., Superior Beverage Co., 827 F. Supp. at 484-85 (providing a $50,000 grant to two 
legal ethics professors proposing to develop “a series of short videos consisting, for the most part, 
of interviews with attorneys who have faced ethical dilemmas”). 
74 See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 250, 1991 WL 32867, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 6, 1991) (awarding a multi-million dollar reserve fund to the National Association for 
Public Interest Law (NAPIL) for the creation of the National Public Interest Fellowship 
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medical and educational charities also occur frequently, are rarely relevant 
to the underlying suit, and are often local to the awarding court, even when 
the underlying class has a national scope.76 Cy pres awards can even some-
times end up benefiting the defendant. Courts have granted cy pres awards 
to charities created, managed, or promoted by defendants,77 and defendants 
can subsequently publicize cy pres awards as charitable giving without 
disclosing the reason behind the gift.78 Even admirable awards, such as one 
judge’s timely effort to use a cy pres award to support the Red Cross’s 
Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, often confer no real benefit to the class.79 
 
Program); see also Superior Beverage Co., 827 F. Supp. at 486-87 (awarding $350,000 plus income 
held in trust to NAPIL’s fellowship program, contingent on NAPIL raising an additional $700,000 
in the next year). 
75 See, e.g., Velez v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 04 Civ. 09194, 2010 WL 4877852, at *5-6 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010) (distributing $23,500 cy pres awards to the Employee Rights Advocacy 
Institute for Law and Policy, the Impact Fund, and the National Women’s Law Employment 
Project, among other recipients); Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 646 F. Supp. 2d 743, 748, 755 (E.D. 
Pa. 2009) (designating the Senior Law Center and Legal Aid of Southeastern Pennsylvania as the 
cy pres recipients of any unclaimed funds); Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 631 F. Supp. 2d 
242, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (distributing cy pres awards of $250,000 each to the Samuelson Law, 
Technology & Public Policy Clinic at Boalt Hall Law School and the Center for Democracy and 
Technology’s Ronald Plesser Fellowship); In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 
2d 1392, 1395-98 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (distributing $250,000 cy pres awards from a NASCAR 
merchandise class action to nine charitable organizations, including the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, 
the Georgia Legal Services Program, and the Lawyers Foundation of Georgia).  
76 See, e.g., Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395-98 (providing awards to 
the Make-A-Wish Foundation, the American Red Cross, Race Against Drugs, Children’s 
Healthcare of Atlanta, Kids’ Chance, Duke Children’s Hospital and Health Center, and the Susan 
G. Komen Foundation).  
77 See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817, 820-22 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming the 
award of $6.5 million in a class action against Facebook for privacy violations in which individual 
distributions were not feasible to a newly created charity to be run by three named directors, 
including Facebook’s own Director of Public Policy), reh’g & reh’g en banc denied, 709 F.3d 791 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013); Park v. Thomson Corp., No. 05 Civ. 
2931, 2008 WL 4684232, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2008) (proposing that the remainder in a class 
action alleging unfair pricing practices by BAR/BRI be used by BAR/BRI to establish a scholarship 
fund for lawyers entering public service); Schwartz v. Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 362 F. 
Supp. 2d 574, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (awarding the $436,000 remainder in a class action brought on 
behalf of purchasers of the NFL Sunday Ticket satellite TV package to the NFL’s Youth Educa-
tion Town Centers, youth centers sponsored and funded in large part by the NFL). 
78 See SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[C]y pres 
distributions often stray even further from the ‘next best use’ to a use that actually benefits the 
defendant rather than the plaintiffs. In general, defendants reap goodwill from the donation of 
monies to a good cause.”). 
79 In the baby formula price-fixing case, for instance, the judge reasoned that  
one of the challenges faced by rescue workers in the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina 
is providing essential food and drink to the victims of the storm. In fact, the provision 
of infant formula is one of the chief priorities of rescue officials. Thus, a donation to 
the American Red Cross, which coordinates the delivery of such essential products to 
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This is not to suggest that any of these causes are unworthy of charitable 
gifts; but it seems unlikely that they are the most relevant choice of poten-
tial cy pres recipients.80  
If cy pres awards are meant to give effect to the legislative intent behind 
a cause of action by compensating the victims of wrongdoing, these cases 
represent failings of the doctrine. Although these awards may have broad 
societal impact, the benefit they confer on class members is de minimis. 
This outcome raises substantial equity concerns by transforming class 
actions into a tax which converts damages theoretically owed to individual 
plaintiffs into general societal benefit at the expense of the individuals’ 
recovery.81 And it affects the parties whose interests are least likely to be 
represented in the proceeding—those class members who are unaware of the 
litigation or are unable to represent their interests in court.82 
B. Courts Are Poorly Suited to Direct Cy Pres Awards 
Even when courts try to apply the nearness standard, they are ill-suited 
to reach the correct result. In class action cy pres, the courts must answer 
two questions: (1) what is the cause of action’s underlying legislative intent, 
and (2) what cy pres awards would best fulfill that intent. The first question 
is within the core competency of the judiciary and is simple to answer 
because the legislative purpose is almost always to make the injured parties 
whole. But the courts, as one federal judge put it, “are often not in the best 
position to choose a charitable organization that would best approximate the 
unpaid class members’ interests.”83  
Class members, as a group, often have unique interests or preferences 
related to the criteria that bind them as a class. Judges, as outsiders to the 
class without special knowledge or expertise, are poorly equipped to determine 
what would best benefit unrepresented class members (short of receiving 
 
the victims of the hurricane, will be geared toward “combatting harms similar to those 
that injured the class members.” 
In re Infant Formula Multidistrict Litig., No. 91-878, 2005 WL 2211312, at *3-4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 
2005) (citations omitted). 
80 See Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distributions in Class Action Settlements, 2009 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1014, 1027 (“[I]t seems unlikely that legal aid societies are a strong choice [for cy pres 
awards], given the many worthwhile charitable organizations that exist.”). 
81 This concern only exists when the alternative recovery, whether direct or in the form of an 
alternative cy pres recipient, would not itself be de minimis in nature.  
82 It is unreasonable to expect the named plaintiff to represent the interests of absent class 
members since their interests do not fully align (and may be adverse, if there is a potential of 
redistribution to identified class members).  
83 Lane v. Page, 862 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1231 (D.N.M. 2012). 
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damages).84 And even plaintiffs’ attorneys, who usually speak for the class, 
cannot be fully trusted to do so in this context because their compensation 
is connected to the size—not the success—of any cy pres awards distributed.85  
By way of example, consider In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price 
Antitrust Litigation, an antitrust case brought by CD purchasers alleging 
price fixing by the record industry.86 The court, left with $271,000 in excess 
funds, solicited proposals from the parties for possible cy pres recipients.87 
WKCR, Columbia University’s FM radio station, received $107,000 to 
furnish a studio with equipment to digitize Columbia’s analog recording 
collection and subsequently distribute it online.88 The court concluded that 
this proposal would benefit class members because “they can access these 
recordings and listen to them in a superior audio quality” and the proposal 
would promote the interest of the underlying cause of action by “preventing 
these funds from reverting to the defendants.”89 Of the remaining three 
proposals, all of which focused on music education, the court donated the 
remaining $156,000 to support the National Guild of Community Schools of 
the Arts’s development of a website to support local community schools of 
the arts.90 The court, applying previously established criteria, found that 
“[c]lass members will indirectly benefit from the development of future 
musical artists, can participate in programming available to adults in their 
particular geographic area, and can benefit from performances at community 
arts schools.”91 The court considered only four options, proposed by class 
counsel and a single objector. Of those options, the court selected beneficiaries 
based on possible trickle-down benefits to class members. But the court did 
so without knowing the identities of class members, their ability to access a 
computer to listen to WKCR-FM’s digitized music collection, or the 
likelihood that they would attend and enjoy Community School of the Arts 
performances. Courts can try to guess at best outcomes, but they will 
 
84 Notably, to the author’s knowledge, no court has ever sought to consult an expert witness 
in an effort to identify a cy pres award that would best serve the interests of the class.  
85 See Wasserman, supra note 25 (manuscript at 28-30) (explaining class counsel’s incentives 
to pursue cy pres awards instead of maximizing distributions to class members).  
86 Order on Cy Pres Provision of Settlement Agreement, supra note 51, at 1. 
87 Id. at 1 & n.2. The proposed potential recipients included Jazz at Lincoln Center, the 
Music for Youth Foundation, the National Guild of Community Schools of the Arts, and radio 
station WKCR-FM of Columbia University. Id. at 1. 
88 Order on Cy Pres Distribution of Excess Settlement Funds at 2-4, In re Compact Disc 
Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. 00-1361 (D. Me. Aug. 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Hornby/MDL/MDL1361_2005_08_09_ORDER32.pdf. 
89 Id. at 3. 
90 Id. at 5. 
91 Id. at 5-6.  
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ultimately rely on mere conjecture about what might be beneficial to class 
members.  
These concerns about the qualifications of the court to determine what 
would “benefit the class” are especially troubling when it comes to geogra-
phy. “Although many class actions are national in scope, . . . there is a 
tendency for charities located near the district in which the class action was 
filed to benefit disproportionately from cy pres distributions.”92 Trial courts 
are inherently local. Judges can be expected to have some level of knowledge 
of the charities within their jurisdictions, but they cannot be aware of every 
charity from every jurisdiction in which class members reside.93 As such, cy 
pres awards often favor local charities over geographically distant charities,94 
thereby disserving the interests of the class as a whole.  
Cy pres also contains an intangible element. Individuals have prefer-
ences, even between two nearly identical outcomes. Such preferences, 
although trivial to the outside observer, may be nonetheless quite important 
to the individual.95 This is especially true in the charitable context, in which 
the means used to attain an end can often be as important as the end itself.96 
Class members can receive both direct and indirect benefits from the 
organization selected. Therefore, selection of an organization disfavored by 
the class might lead to underutilization of the benefits provided. It is thus 
important, although admittedly difficult, for courts to consider the intangible 
preferences of class members in awarding cy pres. 
Beyond problems predicting what would best benefit the class lies a 
deeper issue: courts are not institutionally competent to oversee charitable 
donations. As one judge cautioned, 
 
92 Yospe, supra note 80, at 1030.  
93 This difficulty is compounded by the fact that cases distributed by the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation have the potential to end up before courts without significant local 
connections to the litigation.  
94 See, e.g., In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1395-99 (N.D. 
Ga. 2001) (awarding cy pres to ten organizations—seven of which were located in Georgia—in a 
class action involving merchandise sold nationwide).  
95 See Richard L. Oliver, Whence Consumer Loyalty?, 63 J. MARKETING 33, 38-39 (1999) 
(describing consumer preferences and brand loyalty as a “love-type” attachment of great personal 
importance to the individual consumer).  
96 Consider, for instance, the backlash in 2012 against the Susan G. Komen Foundation after 
it withdrew its funding for Planned Parenthood’s breast cancer screenings. Commentators 
predicted that supporters of the Foundation would withdraw their support not because they 
disagreed with the organization’s goals, but because they had come to disagree with the means it 
was using to pursue them. See Julie Rovner, Planned Parenthood Vs. Komen: Women’s Health Giants 
Face Off Over Abortion, NPR (Feb. 1, 2012 , 6:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/02/01/ 
146242621/planned-parenthood-vs-komen-womens-health-giants-face-off-over-abortion, archived at 
http://perma.cc/95GT-Y8WN (discussing the dispute between the two organizations, its causes, 
and the possible repercussions).  
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[f ]ederal judges are not generally equipped to be charitable foundations: we 
are not accountable to boards or members for funding decisions we make; 
we are not accustomed to deciding whether certain nonprofit entities are 
more “deserving” of limited funds than others; and we do not have the in-
stitutional resources and competencies to monitor that “grantees” abide by 
the conditions we or the settlement agreements set.97 
Courts are designed to adjudicate conflicts, not to decide what uses of 
charitable funds would best benefit a class. The judiciary lacks the mecha-
nisms to facilitate factual determinations about what uses would best benefit 
the class. What little knowledge and qualification a judge has to decide 
these questions is often cabined to his or her jurisdiction. And even if the 
mechanisms for this kind of searching inquiry did exist, courts would lack 
the time necessary to avail themselves of these resources. The courts simply 
are not designed to handle this kind of searching administrative judgment 
and long-term management. When they try to act in the capacity of a 
“charitable foundation,” they are flying blind.  
C. Ethical Dilemmas 
Current class action cy pres excels in one area: creating the appearance 
of impropriety.98 Some jurisdictions forbid cy pres awards to entities in 
which the court or counsel is interested,99 but others do not.100 And even in 
those that do ban such awards, limits on judicial resources and the defendants’ 
 
97 Yospe, supra note 80, at 1021-22 (quoting In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price 
Antitrust Litig., 236 F.R.D. 48, 53 (D. Me. 2006)).  
98 See Litigation Abuses, supra note 60, at 21 (statement of Theodore H. Frank, Adjunct Fellow, 
Manhattan Institute for Legal Policy, President, Center for Class Action Fairness) (describing 
class action cy pres distributions as “one of the leading ways to abuse the settlement process to 
create the illusion of class recovery while diverting the true bulk of the settlement to the 
attorneys”); see also In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(“[H]aving judges decide how to distribute cy pres awards both taxes judicial resources and risks 
creating the appearance of judicial impropriety.”).  
99 See AM. LAW INST., supra note 41, § 3.07 cmt. b (“A cy pres remedy should not be or-
dered if the court or any party has any significant prior affiliation with the intended recipient that 
would raise substantial questions about whether the selection of the recipient was made on the 
merits.”); see also, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., Nos. 98-5055, 99-1341, 2008 WL 4542669, 
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2008) (rejecting cy pres awards to the Public Interest Law Center of 
Philadelphia and the Camden Center for Law and Social Justice because attorneys associated with 
the case served in leadership roles or had partners who served in leadership roles in those 
organizations). 
100 See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text (discussing a state supreme court ruling that 
a trial judge could grant a cy pres award to an organization of which he was a member).  
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lack of incentive to challenge specific cy pres recipients mean that improper 
awards are unlikely to be detected.  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys have strong incentives to maximize cy pres awards. 
Cy pres awards count toward the total damages from which class counsel 
draw contingent fees, even in cases where the cy pres does not benefit the 
class members.101 Thus, class counsel’s financial interests become “isolated 
from her efforts to compensate individual class members” and “[t]he focus 
becomes maximizing the total award, rather than the amount that goes 
directly to the class members.”102 From the perspectives of speed and 
efficiency, class counsel have incentives to favor cy pres over distributions to 
class members. Class counsel also seek to appease the judges reviewing class 
settlements and in some cases can do so by providing the judge with cy pres 
distributions that the judge can guide to recipients of his or her choosing, 
even when it is not in the class’s best interests.103  
Courts are equally susceptible. Cy pres awards require fewer judicial 
resources than further attempts at distributions to class members. Furthermore, 
cy pres gives courts the rare opportunity to allocate funds to outside entities 
and to have an impact beyond the courtroom. The literature on judicial 
reasoning shows multiple avenues through which the possibility of awarding 
cy pres can influence judicial decisionmaking.104 Judges should, of course, 
award cy pres neutrally, without letting their personal views color their 
approval of cy pres awards.105 But whether due to overt intentions or 
subconscious biases, judges are not always able to do so,106 and neither party 
has an interest in challenging a judge’s decision to award cy pres, which 
inevitably hastens the end of litigation.107 In light of the lack of checks on 
 
101 See Redish, supra note 7, at 640 (noting that cy pres awards are included when calculating 
attorneys’ fees). 
102 Johnston, supra note 32, at 290-91. 
103 See id. at 286-87 (examining how cy pres awards can influence judicial decisionmaking). 
104 See id. at 287-88 for a more robust discussion of how cy pres interacts with existing theo-
ries of judicial reasoning. 
105 See id. (“[A]n impartial or unbiased judge should never award a cy pres distribution or 
approve a settlement with a distribution based on his own preferences for a charity or organiza-
tion . . . .”).  
106 Again, consider how many cy pres awards go to legal institutions. See, e.g., supra notes 71-
75 and accompanying text (providing examples of distributions to bar foundations, law schools, law 
professors, and public interest organizations); see also Yospe, supra note 80, at 1027 (arguing that 
“donating to legal aid societies seems to indicate the preference of the judge and the lawyers 
involved in the settlement”).  
107 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the strongest challenges to cy pres awards originate in legal advo-
cacy organizations uninterested in the litigation, such as the Center for Class Action Fairness.  
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judicial discretion, the sheer volume of funds being distributed creates room 
for an “appearance of impropriety.”108  
Beyond these susceptibilities, the sizeable funds involved in cy pres 
rewards, the lack of adversarial process, and the deference of appellate 
review afforded cy pres awards109 have facilitated genuinely unethical 
conduct. Both counsel110 and courts have used cy pres to benefit themselves, 
their families, and their preferred charitable causes (often their law 
schools).111 Such conduct violates professional ethics, disservices the injured 
class, and fuels attacks on the class action mechanism more broadly.  
D. Systematic Bias 
Beyond individual influences, cy pres awards are also subject to systematic 
biases. Most courts do not publicly advertise potential cy pres distributions, 
advantaging groups and entities with the resources and legal acumen to 
monitor pending class action proceedings. Likewise, organizations with high 
 
108 See SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[W]hile 
courts and the parties may act with the best intentions, the specter of judges and outside entities 
dealing in the distribution and solicitation of large sums of money creates an appearance of 
impropriety.”).  
109 See Yospe, supra note 80, at 1037-41 (describing some of the “few reported cases in which 
the federal courts of appeals have reversed a district court’s cy pres decision”).  
110 In Diamond Chemical Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215 (D.D.C. 
2007), the lead plaintiff ’s attorney sought a $5.1 million cy pres award to the George Washington 
University Law School. In a subsequent ruling, the judge granted the award. Diamond Chem. Co. 
v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., Nos. 01-2118, 02-1018, 2007 WL 2007447, at *5 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007). 
The attorney, an alumnus of the recipient law school, was subsequently awarded membership in 
the “L’Enfant Society,” the “most prestigious of [George Washington University]’s gift societies” 
for donors giving over $5 million in recognition of his “instrumental” role in the award. George 
Washington University Leadership Donors, GEO. WASH. U., http://development.gwu.edu/pdfs/ 
2007donor_program.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7QHM-DTM4; see 
also Johnston, supra note 32, at 292-93 (same). In another notable case in the Northern District of 
California, class counsel steered the cy pres award to a charity run by his ex-wife. See Litigation 
Abuses, supra note 60, at 31 (statement of Theodore H. Frank, Adjunct Fellow, Manhattan Institute 
for Legal Policy, President, Center for Class Action Fairness) (describing this award in the context 
of a general discussion of the problematic nature of such awards). 
111 For example, Chattahoochee Circuit Superior Court Judge Douglas C. Pullen stepped 
down from the bench amid a Judicial Qualifications Commission probe of his cy pres practices. 
Pullen, in the course of his time on the bench, approved a record $33.8 million in cy pres awards, 
many of which went to his alma mater, Mercer University, where he taught part-time. Jim Mustian 
& Chuck Williams, Judge Doug Pullen’s ‘Gifts’: Records Reveal Judge Directed Millions to Mercer and 
Morehouse, Gained Recognition, LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.ledger-
enquirer.com/2011/08/21/1701279_pullens-gifts-records-reveal-judge.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
62MX-U5AH. For another example, see Nathan Koppel, Proposed Facebook Settlement Comes Under 
Fire, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2010, at B8, recounting how Judge Christina Snyder approved a $25,000 
cy pres award to a Los Angeles legal aid organization for which her husband was a board member.  
  
1484 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1463 
 
numbers of lawyers invested in their financial stability have an upper hand. 
Unsurprisingly, law schools (especially those with antitrust programs), legal 
aid organizations, and bar foundations often manage to leverage cy pres 
awards.112  
Against this backdrop, a market is forming around the leveraging of cy 
pres funds. As “the search for new funding sources . . . becomes ever more 
imperative” for charitable organizations, cy pres is becoming “a source of 
funding for public interest and legal services organizations whose work can 
be said to further the interests of the class.”113 Many law firms tout their cy 
pres victories as public service114 and many cy pres recipients recognize the 
generosity of the plaintiffs’ firms securing those awards.115 Some public 
interest legal organizations now offer content advocating why they are an 
ideal choice for cy pres awards in an effort to win the support of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers and judges.116 
 
112 For instance, more than twenty years after the successful mass tort litigation relating to 
the fire at the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel, the Animal Legal Defense Fund “became aware that 
there may be some unclaimed funds” and expressed that it would appreciate the court’s “considera-
tion of us as a cy pres award of such funds.” In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 687 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 4 ex. A (D.P.R. 2010). The court, desiring to put the funds to good use, donated the 
remaining unclaimed funds to the ALDF despite the lack of any relation to the underlying cause 
of action. Id. at 2-3.  
113 BRAD SELIGMAN & JOCELYN LARKIN, FLUID RECOVERY AND CY PRES: A FUNDING 
SOURCE FOR LEGAL SERVICES 1 (2011), available at http://www.impactfund.org/downloads/ 
Resources/CyPres2011.pdf.  
114 See, e.g., OHIO LAW. GIVE BACK, http://www.ohiolawyersgiveback.org (last visited Mar. 
21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6G6U-ULLY (encouraging the use of cy pres to benefit 
Ohio’s charitable organizations and highlighting the cy pres victories of the sponsoring law firm). 
115 See, e.g., 2012–2013 Cy Pres Firms, LEGAL AID SOC’Y EMP. L. CENTER, http://www.las-
elc.org/supporters/cy-pres-firms (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/58HE-
DG5Z (acknowledging law firms that designated or helped to secure cy pres distributions for the 
Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center); Firms Recommending Cy Pres Awards, EQUAL JUST. 
WORKS, http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/support-us/cy-pres/firms (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/357D-B5CS (acknowledging law firms recommending the Equal Justice 
Works as a cy pres recipient). 
116 See, e.g., ASIAN AMS. ADVANCING JUST. L.A., CY PRES AWARDS, available at 
http://www.advancingjustice-la.org/sites/default/files/Advancing_Justice-LA_cy_pres_2014.pdf 
(providing an eighteen page pamphlet to support courts and counsel considering Advancing Justice 
for cy pres awards); Cy Pres Awards, INNER CITY L. CENTER, http://www.innercitylaw.org/ 
cy-pres-awards/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P6BY-HCNX (“Because 
Inner City Law Center provides a broad range of service, almost every class is touched by our 
services.”); Designate KGACLC as a Cy Pres Recipient, SANTA CLARA L., http://law.scu.edu/kgaclc/ 
designate-us-a-cy-pres-recipient/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/V6YU-
5S5U (explaining why the Alexander Community Law Center is an optimal recipient of cy pres 
funds).  
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Although some would disagree,117 nothing is inherently wrong with 
potential cy pres recipients seeking to inform the court of their appropri-
ateness as recipients of such awards.118 Yet when organizations actively lobby 
courts and counsel outside the limited scope of a specific litigation, such 
behavior has the potential to divert cy pres awards away from more deserving 
recipients. These practices further entrench systematic bias, as the majority 
of charities engaging in these aggressive legal lobbying efforts are legal 
charities. Thus, when a cy pres recipient is needed, legal charities are best 
positioned to leverage the award. Were this simply an issue of raising funds 
for charity, such proactive strategies might be praiseworthy. But in the cy 
pres context, they deprive more deserving, less savvy groups of cy pres 
awards, regardless of which entity is best suited to satisfying the nearness 
requirement.  
A particularly telling illustration of this systematic bias appears in 
Adams v. CSX Railroads.119 In Adams, a case concerning harm caused by 
“train car leakage,” the trial court appointed a special master to consider 
possible cy pres awards to benefit the impacted community.120 The special 
master’s recommendation included a ten percent distribution to the Louisiana 
Bar Foundation, of which the trial court judge was a member.121 At the trial 
court’s request, the Louisiana Bar Foundation filed a post-trial memorandum 
addressing the propriety of an award to the Louisiana Bar Foundation in 
light of potentially conflicting Louisiana Supreme Court precedent.122 
When the court denied the award, the Louisiana Bar Foundation appealed, 
and the matter ultimately came before the Louisiana Supreme Court.123 The 
Louisiana Bar Foundation’s legal acumen allowed it to fight for and ulti-
mately receive a cy pres distribution that a less skilled organization might 
not have secured.124 These systematic biases threaten to divert cy pres 
awards away from their most efficient possible uses and compound existing 
problems with current use of cy pres in class actions.  
 
117 See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 32, at 294 (arguing that such behavior constitutes improper 
lobbying of the courts).  
118 One potentially redeeming aspect of such behavior is that it creates a pseudo-adversarial 
process, better informing the courts of the merits of potential recipients.  
119 80 So. 3d 1160 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
120 Id. at 1162.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Adams v. CSX R.Rs., 84 So. 3d 1289 (La. 2012).  
124 Id. at 1291 (holding that the trial judge could disburse cy pres funds to the Louisiana Bar 
Foundation without violating ethics rules). 
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E. Legal Flaws 
Although many current flaws in cy pres rest in the inequitable process 
and outcomes caused by cy pres awards, the doctrine is also legally problematic. 
The modern application of class action cy pres, although in line with the 
limits of Shepherd’s original proposal,125 is nonetheless constitutionally 
infirm. American cy pres is based on the equitable doctrine of judicial cy 
pres, which allowed the courts to repurpose charitable trusts to give effect to 
the testator’s clearly established intent. When a court applies cy pres 
ungoverned by a nearness requirement, its actions fall outside the historical 
bounds of judicial cy pres. The decisions described above are thus clear 
applications, in principle, of prerogative cy pres, a power based in the king’s 
ability to act as parens patriae.126 Prerogative cy pres cannot be delegated to 
the courts; the power to act as parens patriae lies with the sovereign and so 
vests in the executive and legislative functions of state government.127 
Although the states do have the power to expressly delegate portions of 
their parens patriae powers to the federal government,128 the Supreme 
Court has expressly disclaimed the existence of prerogative powers in the 
 
125 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that Shepherd proposed cy pres distribu-
tions targeting “broader public service” only when “benefit to the class becomes unattainable”).  
126 FISCH, supra note 3, at 56-57 (describing the commonly accepted theory concerning the 
origins of prerogative cy pres).  
127 See Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1854) (“[W]hen this country achieved 
its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this 
power still remains with them, except so far as they have delegated a portion of it to the federal 
government. The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment. The State, as a 
sovereign, is the parens patriae.”); see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 58 (1890) (same); Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 
576 (1867) (“[Prerogative cy pres] has never, so far as we know, been introduced into the practice 
of any court in this country; and, if it exists anywhere here, it is in the legislature of the Com-
monwealth as succeeding to the powers of the king as parens patriae. It certainly cannot be 
exercised by the judiciary of a state whose constitution declares that ‘the judicial department shall 
never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a 
government of laws and not of men.’” (citations omitted)); 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW 509 n.b (5th ed. 1844) (“In this country, the legislature or government of the 
state, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of a public nature, by virtue of its 
general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is intrusted with 
it.”). For similar state decisions locating the locus of prerogative powers in “the several states” or 
in “the people,” see FISCH, supra note 3, at 58 n.55. This outcome is appealing from a policy 
perspective: the legislative and executive branches of government are uniquely competent to 
determine what potential use of charitable funds would best optimize societal benefit.  
128 Fontain, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 384 (describing how, at the time of independence, the 
prerogatives of the crown were delegated to the “people of the States . . . except so far as they 
have delegated a portion of it to the federal government”). 
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federal courts.129 Just as the use of class action cy pres to benefit unidentified 
class members is not so far removed from judicial cy pres, the use of cy pres 
to benefit “the public at large” is not so far removed from prerogative cy 
pres. In light of the clear disfavor toward prerogative cy pres and judicial 
exercise of the parens patriae role existing within our constitutional framework, 
courts should be wary of distributing class action funds in this manner.  
III. TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC CY PRES 
The current cy pres system suffers from significant flaws. The nearness 
analysis too often proves difficult or impossible for courts to perform 
adequately. Yet cy pres is vital to the current structure of class actions under 
Rule 23, and eliminating or restricting cy pres could cause more problems 
than it would solve.  
So how should courts determine what cy pres awards to make? Courts 
should ask what awards would actually benefit the class. Of course, cy pres 
awards are predominantly used when the individual class members cannot 
be identified for compensation. But through the use of approximations—in 
the form of the identified class members or, for unidentifiable classes, 
similarly situated stand-ins who are likely class members—courts stand to 
gain valuable insights into what awards would be appropriate. Such guid-
ance would reduce the need for untargeted “public good” cy pres awards, 
increase the fairness of the mechanism, and promote democratic values 
within the judicial process. By incorporating such guidance discretionarily, 
perhaps managed through a special master, courts would avoid the need for 
a formal change to the rules of procedure. A formal shift, however, might be 
desirable in the future if incorporating class input improves the equity and 
outcomes of cy pres distributions.  
This proposal is supported by existing scholarship recognizing the poten-
tial benefits gained from involving lay citizens in the cy pres process.130 This 
quasi-democratic mechanism would be beneficial in two distinct circumstances. 
 
129 Id. (“The courts of the United States cannot exercise any equity powers, except those 
conferred by acts of congress, and those judicial powers which the high court of chancery in 
England, acting under its judicial capacity as a court of equity, possessed and exercised, at the time 
of the formation of the constitution of the United States. Powers not judicial, exercised by the 
chancellor merely as the representative of the sovereign, and by virtue of the king’s prerogative as 
parens patriae, are not possessed by the circuit courts.”). See generally Thomas E. Blackwell, The 
Charitable Corporation and the Charitable Trust, 24 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1938) (discussing the care that 
charitable corporations should take when receiving “bequests and deeds of gift”). 
130 See Yospe, supra note 80, at 1055 (positing that the use of independent committees consisting 
of “a broad mix of society” and “plaintiff class counsel and defense counsel” to determine cy pres 
awards could substantially reduce bias problems).  
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The first is when a class action involves unidentifiable or unresponsive class 
members that cannot be reached by damages. The second is when, after the 
settlement of all class claims, an unexpected remainder is left in the class 
fund. These circumstances could be addressed in the same manner: by 
seeking the input of the entire identified class on how they would like the cy 
pres award distributed in light of the purpose of the award. For the reasons 
discussed in Part II, identified class members are in a far better position 
than courts to identify the interests of the class and to assign cy pres 
distributions to causes that would substantially benefit the class. Although 
the cy pres distributions in these two scenarios have different purposes 
(benefiting the unidentified class members and benefiting the class as a 
whole), these two purposes merge into one in practice, given that no cy pres 
award can be crafted to benefit only unidentified class members.  
A. Distributions to Substantially Identifiable Classes 
1. Crowdsourcing 
The optimal solution to the cy pres problem is for courts to adopt a 
crowdsourcing model. Crowdsourcing is “[t]he practice of obtaining infor-
mation or services by soliciting input from a large number of people, 
typically via the Internet and often without offering compensation”131 and 
has become a major driver behind innovation in the commercial and chari-
table sectors over the last decade.132 By leveraging modern commercial 
 
131 Crowdsourcing, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/376403 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Q4ZA-FZCQ. For a more robust definition, 
see Enrique Estellés-Arolas & Fernando Gonzáles-Ladrón-de-Guevara, Towards an Integrated 
Crowdsourcing Definition, 38 J. INFO. SCI. 189, 197 (2012), which defines crowdsourcing as 
a type of participative online activity in which an individual [or] an institu-
tion . . . proposes to a group of individuals of varying knowledge, heterogeneity, 
and number, via a flexible open call, the voluntary undertaking of a task. The undertaking 
of the task, of variable complexity and modularity, and in which the crowd should par-
ticipate bringing their work, money, knowledge and/or experience, always entails mutual 
benefit. The user will receive the satisfaction of a given type of need, be it economic, 
social recognition, self-esteem, or the development of individual skills, while the 
crowdsourcer will obtain and utilize to their advantage what the user has brought to the 
venture, whose form will depend on the type of activity undertaken. 
132 For crowdsourcing that drives production decisions, see, for example, KICKSTARTER, 
http://www.kickstarter.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/TR5P-49BB, 
which allows consumers to fund product ideas that they would like to see brought to market, and 
LEGO IDEAS, http://ideas.lego.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/KSH3-
KX5F, which allows Lego purchasers to vote for fan-created Lego sets that they would like to see 
enter production. For crowdsourced product design, see, for example, LOCAL MOTORS, 
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crowdsourcing solutions, courts could create a system in which identified 
class members could not only vote on possible recipients but also could 
actively propose new recipients.133 The system could even be designed to 
allow potential recipients the chance to participate by sharing information 
about themselves and their projects once they had initially been recom-
mended as recipients. Guidance on the purpose of the distribution (benefiting 
the class as a whole) could be provided as a preliminary step to gaining 
access to the crowdsourcing portal. Of course, because the process is 
discretionary, the judge would have the power to review the proposed 
distributions and to dismiss any that she found to be clearly inappropriate 
in light of the purposes of cy pres.  
To minimize administrative costs, crowdsourcing materials could be 
included with the distribution of damages or the notice of potential member-
ship in the class.134 In such a scenario, the court would not need to know the 
dollar amount of the distribution in advance. Ranking preferred uses for the 
funds would provide the court with valuable information to guide the 
division of funds. High participation rates could be expected so long as an 
estimate of the possible remainder value was provided because the substantial 
value of such remainders would likely offset the indirect nature of the 
benefits in the minds of the class.  
The crowdsourcing model would have substantial benefits over the current 
system of cy pres distributions. By placing the initial selection of cy pres 
beneficiaries in the hands of the class, which can identify recipients whose 
selection will benefit its members, the need for general cy pres awards is 
eliminated. Concerns about accuracy will also be eliminated because the 
majority of the class members are well positioned to make judgments about 
what is in their best interests. Perhaps most important, the role of judges 
 
http://localmotors.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/UV8L-E483, which 
uses crowdsourcing to design limited-production vehicles. See also Steve Lohr, Pentagon Pushes 
Crowdsourced Manufacturing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:15 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2012/04/05/pentagon-pushes-crowdsourced-manufacturing, archived at http://perma.cc/XG4B-
TQXY (describing the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s plans to use crowdsourcing 
to develop military vehicles). For crowdsourcing in the charitable sector, see, for example, 
INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
N6EN-8K8N, which allows individuals to fund nonprofit activities that they would like to see 
brought to fruition. 
133 Although crowdsourcing is traditionally conducted over the Internet, it could also be 
conducted through paper mailings by soliciting proposed recipients at the time of the initial class 
mailing and providing voting materials at the time of the distribution of damages.  
134 Although determining cy pres recipients at the same time of the initial distribution may 
seem premature, it is already common practice to determine cy pres recipients ex ante. Redish, 
supra note 7, at 657 (noting that in 120 documented cases, federal courts awarded thirty cy pres 
awards ex ante).  
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and lawyers in cy pres would be substantially reduced, minimizing the risks 
of bias and unethical conduct in cy pres awards. 
2. Pure Voting 
A simpler alternative to crowdsourcing is a straight voting model, where 
the class chooses from preselected potential beneficiaries. Pure voting could 
be conducted by paper ballot distributed along with communications to the 
class; thus pure voting would be even easier to implement than crowdsourcing. 
Proposed recipients could be generated by the parties or by public solicitation 
of interested recipients, as in Superior Beverage Co. v. Owen-Illinois, Inc.135 
Straight voting would improve current practice, but it would not solve 
the identified problems with cy pres because ethical concerns remain. 
Although opening the selection of the slate to recipient organizations would 
minimize ethical concerns about judges and lawyers choosing their preferred 
organizations, voting would not remove concerns of bias. By cabining the 
class’s ability to suggest recipients, the resulting award’s accuracy would 
depend entirely on the quality of proposals suggested, leaving substantial 
room for error. And the systematic biases favoring legal aid organizations 
and organizations geographically close to the court would persist, although 
the class’s role in approving the award would lead to greater public awareness, 
and therefore greater public discontent with such awards.  
B. Distributions to Unidentifiable Classes 
The second circumstance in which courts apply cy pres—and the one 
with which they struggle the most—is when virtually the entire class except 
for the named plaintiffs is unidentifiable. In such a case, the only identifiable 
class members would likely be the class representatives. Yet there are still 
avenues for soliciting democratic input to aid in distributing cy pres. 
Existing scholarship favors incorporating lay citizens into court-formed cy 
pres committees to reduce the potential for perceived abuse.136 Such a 
solution, however, would not impact the accuracy of cy pres awards. Lay 
citizens are in no better position, and may be in a worse position, than 
judges and lawyers to determine the recipients that would best benefit the 
 
135 827 F. Supp. 477, 478-87 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (describing how the court “invited applications 
for cy pres grants and for suggestions as to how such cy pres distributions should be made”). 
136 Yospe, supra note 80, at 1055 (“As long as the members of the committee are independent 
and composed from a broad mix of society (including non-lawyers), the bias problems should be 
greatly diminished.”). 
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class.137 But in almost all cases with an unidentifiable class, the class remains 
generally predictable and thus, the court could implement a crowdsourcing 
or direct voting process using a subset of “likely class members.”138 A 
reasonable sample of likely class members would conceivably be sufficient to 
reach an impartial, balanced outcome and to represent the diverse interests 
of the class. This sampling approach would also keep costs down because the 
costs of finding and involving representative individuals would be greater 
than those associated with identifiable classes.  
Although a body of “likely class members” would not be truly repre-
sentative of the class, it would be more representative and better able to 
reach accurate results than any of the existing cy pres designation mecha-
nisms.139 Given the need to limit the body to a reasonably sized sample, 
concerns would arise about ensuring adequate diversity, especially in the 
geographic context. Courts could mitigate these concerns through the use of 
a diverse sample pool or through judicial override in situations where 
awards are limited to narrow geographic scopes.  
C. Benefits and Costs 
Given that these proposals would operate voluntarily, the ultimate award 
of cy pres would remain within the judge’s wisdom and discretion. That 
discretion, however, would be cabined by the proposals put forward. 
Although judges would retain the power to overturn suspect awards, they 
would likely feel obligated to justify such deviations from the class’s 
preferred beneficial use. This system would lead to better-supported cy pres 
decisions and might facilitate more thorough appellate review of cy pres 
awards. By implementing these proposals, courts would improve the 
accuracy of cy pres awards in light of their purpose of benefiting the class. 
These suggestions would also lessen the bite of the procedural concerns 
about cy pres raised by critics.  
 
137 A contrary argument could be made that an individual selected at random is far more 
likely to share points of commonality with a class member than with a judge or lawyer in the vast 
majority of class actions.  
138 A “likely class member” is an individual who identifies as possessing the traits that define 
class membership but who cannot be definitively confirmed as a part of the class. For instance, in a 
class action over diaper price fixing by Brand X, a “likely class member” would be someone who 
routinely purchases Brand X diapers or someone who routinely purchases diapers similar to those 
sold by Brand X.  
139 Assume, arguendo, that the class in the Compact Disc litigation was unidentifiable. A 
“sample” composed of those who had recently bought CDs, even if they may not have purchased 
the CDs at issue, nonetheless would have been better qualified than the judge to determine the 
class’s interests, given the specialized perspective and expertise of the class members as music 
aficionados.  
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This proposal is not without drawbacks. Any democratic or 
crowdsourced decisionmaking risks an outside group leveraging class 
members’ votes for improper purposes. However, those directing cy pres 
awards are already the subjects of substantial lobbying.140 Even if class 
members were subject to lobbying efforts by potential cy pres recipients,141 
the exponentially larger pool of decisionmakers involved in a democratic 
award process would likely diffuse the impact of these efforts. The discre-
tionary nature of this exercise and the necessity of ultimate judicial approval 
would enable judges to veto improper awards, although it is unclear whether 
judges would feel comfortable overriding democratic input absent incontro-
vertible proof of impropriety. 
Another risk is that the class might be wrong. Individual, self-interested, 
and potentially irrational actors might not be the best judges of what would 
serve the needs of the class as a whole. This problem is exacerbated if the 
most effective cy pres remedy involves complicated mechanisms that are 
beyond the scope of the class’s perception of “benefit.” But if the question 
becomes whether cy pres should be based on ultimate effectiveness or on the 
desires of the class, the desires of the class should surely prevail because cy 
pres is supposed to benefit the class. Besides, “efficiency” of benefit has 
never been a substantial part of courts’ cy pres analyses, and this proposal 
does not seek to alter courts’ standards for approving cy pres. 
Perhaps the greatest risk is poor participation. Without substantial par-
ticipation, a democratic input process would lead to outcomes with many of 
the same flaws as the current system. The specter of poor participation is 
especially a concern in light of the generally low levels of class-member 
participation in class actions.142 
But there are reasons to expect that such a democratic input system of 
narrow scope would have far better participation rates than class actions as a 
whole. Although many factors shape class member participation, a few are 
 
140 See supra text accompanying notes 113-16 (discussing specific examples of how public 
interest organizations can leverage cy pres distributions).  
141 Such efforts are unlikely due to the substantial cost they would entail and the limited (and 
unpredictable) nature of cy pres awards.  
142 One study found that, on average, less than 1% of class members opt out and about one 
percent of class members object to classwide settlements. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, 
The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1546-59 (2004). A Federal Judicial Center study similarly found that the 
median percentage of class members who opted out was below 0.2% of the total membership of the 
class. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS 
ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 10 (1996). The same study also found that class members 
attended less than 15% of settlement hearings. Id. at 56-57.  
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critical here, such as (1) inadequate notice of the action,143 (2) structural 
disincentives to meaningful participation,144 (3) the high costs of participa-
tion,145 and, perhaps most importantly, (4) the perception that participation 
is irrelevant.146 All of these factors discourage individual participation in 
class actions but are mitigated or avoided in the present proposal.  
The proposed democratic input methods require no special expertise or 
experience. Crowdsourcing, whether through internet portal or mass 
mailing, is not an inherently complicated or nuanced concept. Notice could 
be delivered in plain language, and clear instructions would ensure that 
almost all class members could participate.147 Furthermore, while intervention 
in a class action requires substantial investment in exchange for potentially 
limited payout, participation in these mechanisms requires only a brief time 
commitment, no legal expense,148 and the promise of a fairly substantial 
payout.149 Perhaps most significantly, crowdsourcing and voting have a 
 
143 In one study, the majority of class action notices (1) did not clearly inform class members 
of the binding effect of the settlement, (2) did not inform class members with an opt-out right that 
they could opt out of the litigation, (3) did not inform class members that they had a right to 
appear through counsel, and (4) did not satisfy the clear and concise language requirement of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See Shannon R. Wheatman & Terri R. LeClercq, Majority of 
Class Action Publication Notices Fail to Satisfy Rule 23 Requirements, 30 REV. LITIG. 53, 58 (2010). 
Class counsel actually has incentive to avoid effective notice because it “is expensive, and will 
likely lead to the discovery of class member preferences or internal class conflicts that class counsel 
would rather ignore.” Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. 
L. REV. 65, 80 (2003).  
144 See, e.g., Lahav, supra note 143, at 89 (“Objectors’ counsel have a perverse incentive to 
drop legitimate objections or soft-pedal them in order to obtain remuneration from the settlement 
because, to the extent that they are paid, objectors’ counsel only receive payment if a settlement is 
approved.”). Courts, fearful that objectors will use their leverage to hold the litigation for ransom, 
have also begun imposing substantial sanctions against objectors. See, e.g., Vollmer v. Publishers 
Clearing House, 248 F.3d 698, 711 (7th Cir. 2001) (reviewing a $50,000 sanction against objectors). 
145 Opt-out and intervention are unrealistic in small claims classes where pursuing independent 
litigation is unrealistic. Lahav, supra note 143, at 81. Even in class actions with substantial damages 
at issue, the cost of retaining counsel to intervene might not be worth the perceived benefits of 
intervention. See, e.g., Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer & Caitlin V. May, The Puzzle of Class 
Actions with Uninjured Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858, 872 (2014) (observing that 
plaintiffs generally cannot afford to hire the attorneys and experts that are necessary to inde-
pendently pursue a claim).  
146 See, e.g., Lawrence W. Schonbrun, The Class Action Con Game, 20 REG. 50, 51 (1997) (listing 
cases in which class action litigation resulted in no benefit or additional harm to class members).  
147 This contrasts starkly with an actual class action, wherein class notice is dense with legalese 
and intervention is challenging without advanced legal knowledge.  
148 As discussed in Part II, class members are uniquely situated to answer the question of 
what benefits them. Although class members could retain counsel, it is hard to see what benefit 
counsel would bring to the average case. 
149 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 131 (2009) (positing an inverse 
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positive image that class action litigation lacks. Accordingly, democratic 
input methods would not be subject to the same participation problems that 
currently plague class actions.  
Despite the potential flaws, voting-based mechanisms can improve the 
accuracy and responsiveness of cy pres awards. These mechanisms would 
address concerns about cy pres awards for the general good transgressing 
into prerogative cy pres because any award chosen by the class must be 
intended to benefit the class. These mechanisms could also rehabilitate the 
image of class actions. By deferring to democratic input, judges can remove 
the appearance of impropriety in selecting recipients and eliminate one of 
the primary grounds currently used to attack the class action process 
generally.150 More important, democratic procedures would increase litigant 
involvement in class actions,151 leading to greater awareness of the process 
and, with time, greater participation in class action proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
American courts are predominately designed to excel at a single task: 
resolving disputes between parties. Once a court decides to award cy pres, 
the process of selecting optimal recipients becomes one of legislative 
inquiry, for which courts are neither designed nor suited. In trust and estate 
law, the courts’ cy pres exercise is guided by the testator’s intent manifested 
in their will. But in class actions, courts have no similar insight to help them 
best serve the interests of the class. Absent guidance, courts stumble in the 
dark, risking erroneous, inefficient, or even potentially unethical outcomes.  
Seeking the input of the represented class is one way that courts, sua 
sponte, can remedy these informational and institutional shortcomings. By 
soliciting class input through crowdsourcing or simple democratic proce-
dures, courts can simplify the information-gathering process as they seek to 
determine which recipients would most benefit the class. Technological 
advances render the marginal costs of implementing such information-
gathering trivial compared to the benefits. Awards crafted in such a manner 
 
relationship between the size of a class member’s claim and their willingness to participate in a 
class action).  
150 The current proposal conceives of democratic input only in the cy pres process. Although 
there are some compelling arguments for expanding democratic inputs to the management of class 
actions generally, cy pres is particularly well-suited to such methods, given that it is one of few 
matters in which class counsel lack any specialized knowledge or experience. For more on 
democratic governance of class actions, see generally Lahav, supra note 143, at 99-106.  
151 A crowdsourcing system, even one requiring only brief interactions, would generate 
increased interest in the suit and the class action process as compared to the limited communica-
tions that class members currently receive.  
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would be fairer and more accurate, would reduce the risks and appearance of 
potential impropriety, and would strengthen cy pres awards against challenge 
and reversal. Ultimately, these advances would constitute a first step toward 
a class action system that fosters individual participation in the class action 
process.  
 
